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Abstract. The sentences of deontic logic may be understood as describ-
ing what an agent ought to do when faced with a given set of norms. If
these norms come into conflict, the best the agent can be expected to
do is to follow a maximal subset of the norms. Intuitively, a priority or-
dering of the norms can be helpful in determining the relevant sets and
resolve conflicts, but a formal resolution mechanism has been difficult
to provide. In particular, reasoning about prioritized conditional imper-
atives is overshadowed by problems such as the ‘order puzzle’ that are
not satisfactorily resolved by existing approaches. The paper provides a
new proposal as to how these problems may be overcome.
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1 Drinking and Driving
Imagine you have been invited to a party. Before the event, you become the
recipient of various imperative sentences:
(1) Your mother says: if you drink anything, then don’t drive.
(2) Your best friend says: if you go to the party, then you do the driving.
(3) Some acquaintance says: if you go to the party, then have a drink with me.
Suppose that as a rule you do what your mother tells you – after all, she is the
most important person in your life. Also, the last time you went to a party your
best friend did the driving, so it really is your turn now. You can enjoy yourself
without a drink, though it would be nice to have a drink with your acquaintance
– your best friend would not mind if you had one drink, and your acquaintance
does not care that you may be driving – but your mother would not approve of
such a behavior. Making up your mind,
(4) You go to the party.
I think it is quite clear what you must do: obey your mother and your best friend,
and hence do the driving and deny your acquaintance’s request. However, it is
not so clear what formal algorithm could explain this reasoning.
? I am grateful to Lou Goble, John F. Horty and Leon van der Torre for helpful
comments and discussions in preparing this paper.
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An example of a similar form was first employed in epistemic logic,1 and
has been termed the ‘order puzzle’ (cf. Horty [22]). For the epistemic version,
consider the following sentences:
(5) You remember from physics: if you are in a car, lightning won’t strike you.
(6) The coroner tells you: he was struck by lightning.
(7) Your neighbor says: he must have been drinking and driving.
Suppose that driving includes being in a car, that you firmly believe in what you
remember from physics, that you believe that information by medical officers is
normally based on competent investigation, and that you usually don’t question
your neighbor’s observations, but think that sometimes she is just speculating.
It seems quite clear what happens: you keep believing what you remember from
school, and don’t doubt what the coroner told you, but question your neighbor’s
information, maybe answering: “This can’t be true, as the authorities found he
was struck by lightning, and you can’t be struck by lightning in a car”.
In both cases, the problem as to how the underlying reasoning can be formally
reconstructed seems so far unsolved. Both involve a ranking, or priority ordering,
of the sentences involved. Concentrating on the imperative side of things, in what
follows, I will consider various proposals from the literature that have been put
forward to explain the reasoning about such prioritized conditionals, discuss
their strengths and weaknesses in relation to problems such as the one above,
and finally propose a fresh solution that solves the problem.
2 Formal Preliminaries
To formally discuss problems such as the one presented above, I shall use a
simple framework: let I be a set of objects, they are meant to be (conditional)
imperatives. Two functions g and f associate with each imperative an antecedent
and a consequent – these are sentences from the language of a basic logic that
here will be the language LPL of propositional logic.2 g(i) may be thought of
as describing the ‘grounds’, or circumstances in which the consequent of i is to
hold, and f(i) as associating the sentence that describes what must be the case if
the imperative i is satisfied, its ‘deontic focus’ or ‘demand’.3 In accordance with
tradition (cf. Hofstadter and McKinsey [20]), I write A ⇒!B for an i ∈ I with
g(i) = A and f(i) = B, and !A means an unconditional imperative > ⇒!A. Note
1 Cf. Rintanen [36] p. 234, who in turn credits Brewka with its invention.
2 PL is based on a language LPL, defined from a set of proposition letters Prop =
{p1, p2, ...}, Boolean connectives ‘¬’, ‘∧’, ‘∨’, ‘→’, ‘↔’ and brackets ‘(’, ‘)’ as usual.
The truth of a LPL-sentence A is defined recursively using a valuation function
v : Prop → {1, 0} (I write v |= A), starting with v |= p iff v(p) = 1 and continuing
as usual. If A ∈ LPL is true for all valuations it is called a tautology. PL is the set of
all tautologies, and this set is used to define provability, consistency and derivability
(I write Γ `PL A) as usual. > is an arbitrary tautology, and ⊥ is ¬>.
3 In analogy to Reiter’s default logic one might add a third function e that describes
exceptional circumstances in which the imperative is not to be applied. I will not
address this additional complexity here.
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that A⇒!B is just the name for a conditional imperative that demands B to be
made true in a situation where A is true – it is not an object that is assigned truth
values. I write m(i) for pg(i)→ f(i)q and call m(i) the ‘materialization’ of i, as
it represents the material implication that may be thought of as corresponding
to the conditional imperative. For any i ∈ I and ∆ ⊆ I, instead of f(i), g(i),
m(i), f(∆), g(∆) and m(∆), I may use the superscripted if , ig, im, ∆f , ∆g and
∆m for better readability.
Let I be a tuple 〈I, f, g〉, let W ⊆ LPL be a set of sentences, representing
‘real world facts’, and ∆ ⊆ I be a subset of the imperatives: then we define
TriggeredI(W,∆) =df {i ∈ ∆ | W `PL g(i)}.
So an imperative i ∈ ∆ is triggered if its antecedent is true given W . Tradition
wants it that a conditional imperative can only be fulfilled or violated if its
condition is the case.4 So I define:
SatisfiedI(W,∆) =df {i ∈ ∆ | W `PL ig ∧ if},
ViolatedI(W,∆) =df {i ∈ ∆ | W `PL ig ∧ ¬if},
An imperative in SatisfiedI(W,∆) [ViolatedI(W,∆)] is called satisfied [violated]
given the facts W . It is of course possible that an imperative is neither satisfied
nor violated given the facts W . If an imperative is triggered, but not violated,
we call the imperative satisfiable:
SatisfiableI(W,∆) =df {i ∈ TriggeredI(W,∆) | W 0PL ¬if}.
Moreover, we define
ObeyableI(W,∆) =df {Γ ⊆ ∆ | Γm ∪W 0PL ⊥}.
So a subset Γ of ∆ is obeyable given W iff it is not the case that for some
{i1, ..., in} ⊆ Γ we have W `PL (ig1 ∧ ¬if1 ) ∨ ... ∨ (ign ∧ ¬ifn): otherwise we know
that whatever we do, i.e. given any maxiconsistent subset V of LPL that extends
W ⊆ V , at least one imperative in Γ is violated.5 We speak of a conflict of
imperatives when the triggered imperatives cannot all be satisfied given the
facts W , i.e. when TriggeredI(W,∆)f ∪W `PL ⊥. More generally speaking I will
also call imperatives conflicting if they are not obeyable in the given situation.
As prioritized conditional imperatives are our concern here, we let all im-
peratives in I be ordered by some priority relation <⊆ I × I. The relation <
is assumed to be a strict partial order on I, i.e. < is irreflexive and transitive,
and additionally we assume < to be well-founded, i.e. infinite descending chains
are excluded. For any i1, i2 ∈ I, i1 < i2 means that i1 takes priority over i2
(ranks higher than i2, is more important than i2, etc.). A tuple 〈I, f, g〉 will be
called a conditional imperative structure, and 〈I, f, g,<〉 a prioritized conditional
imperative structure. If all imperatives in I are unconditional, we may drop any
reference to the relation g in the tuples and call these basic imperative structures
and prioritized imperative structures respectively.
4 Cf. Rescher [35], Sosa [40], van Fraassen [10]. Also cf. Greenspan [12]: “Oughts do
not arise, it seems, until it is too late to keep their conditions from being fulfilled.”
5 Terms differ here, e.g. Downing [8] uses the term ‘compliable’ instead of ‘obeyable’.
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3 Deontic Concepts
Given a set of imperatives, one may truly or falsely state that their addressee
must, or must not, perform some act or achieve some state of affairs according to
what the addressee was ordered to do. For instance, in the ‘drinking and driving’
example from sec. 1 I think it is true that the agent ought to do the driving, as
this is what the second-ranking imperative, uttered by the best friend, requires
the agent to do, but that it would be false to say that the agent ought to drink
and drive. Statements that something ought to be done or achieved are called
‘normative’ or ‘deontic statements’, and the ultimate goal is to find a logical
semantics that models the situation and defines the deontic concepts in such a
way that the formal results coincide with our natural inclinations in the matter.
3.1 Deontic operators for unconditional imperatives
For unconditional imperatives, such definitions are straightforward. Given a basic
imperative structure I = 〈I, f〉, a monadic deontic O-operator is defined by
(td -m1) I |= OA if and only if (iff) If `PL A.
So obligation is defined in terms of what the satisfaction of all imperatives logi-
cally implies. With the usual truth definitions for Boolean operators, it can easily
be seen that such a definition produces a normal modal operator, i.e. one that
is defined by the following axiom schemes plus modus ponens:
(Ext) If `PL A↔ B, then OA↔ OB is a theorem.
(M) O(A ∧B)→ (OA ∧OB)
(C) (OA ∧OB)→ O(A ∧B)
(N) O>
Furthermore, (td -m1) defines standard deontic logic SDL, which adds
(D) OA→ ¬O¬A
iff the imperatives are assumed to be non-conflicting and so If is PL-consistent,
i.e. If 0PL ⊥. It is immediate that in the case of conflicts, (td -m1) pronounces
everything as obligatory, and in particular defines O⊥ true, thus making the
impossible obligatory. If conflicts are not excluded, a solution is to only consider
(maximal) subsets of the imperatives whose demands are consistent and define
the O-operator with respect to these (I write I uprise ¬C for the set of all ‘¬C-
remainders’, i.e. maximal subsets Γ of I such that Γ f 0PL ¬C):
(td -m2) I |= OA iff ∀Γ ∈ Iuprise⊥ : Γ f `PL A
Quite similarly, a dyadic deontic operator O(A/C), meaning that A ought to
be true given that C is true, can be defined with respect to the maximal subsets
of imperatives that do not conflict in these circumstances:
(td -d1) I |= O(A/C) iff ∀Γ ∈ Iuprise¬C : Γ f `PL A
So A is obligatory given that C is true if A is what the imperatives in any ¬C-
remainder demand. In the case of conflicts, this definition produces a “disjunctive
solution”: e.g. if there are two imperatives !A and !B with `PL C → (A→ ¬B),
then neither O(A/C) nor O(B/C) but O(A ∨B/C) is true.6
6 For alternative solutions to the problem of conflicts cf. Goble [11] and my [13], [14].
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Often, we want to use the information that we have about the circumstances
also for reasoning about the obligations in these circumstances. E.g. if the set
of imperatives is {!(p1 ∨ p2)}, ordering me to either send you a card or phone
you, and I cannot send you a card, i.e. ¬p1 is true, I should be able to conclude
that I should phone you, and so O(p2/¬p1) should be true. Such ‘circumstantial
reasoning’ is achieved by the following change to the truth definition:
(td -d2) I |= O(A/C) iff ∀Γ ∈ Iuprise¬C : Γ f ∪ {C} `PL A
With the usual truth conditions for Boolean operators, a semantics that employs
(td -d2) has a sound and (weakly) complete axiom system PD that equals the
system P of Kraus, Lehmann, Magidor [23], defined by these axiom schemes
(DExt) If `PL A↔ B then O(A/C)↔ O(B/C) is a theorem.
(DM) O(A ∧B/C)→ (O(A/C) ∧O(B/C))
(DC) O(A/C) ∧O(B/C)→ O(A ∧B/C)
(DN) O(>/C)
(ExtC) If `PL C ↔ D then O(A/C)↔ O(A/D) is a theorem.
(CCMon) O(A ∧D/C)→ O(A/C ∧D)
(CExt) If `PL C → (A↔ B) then O(A/C)↔ O(B/C) is a theorem.
(Or) O(A/C) ∧O(A/D)→ O(A/C ∨D)
with the additional (restricted) dyadic ‘deontic’ axiom scheme
(DD-R) If 0PL ¬C then `PD O(A/C)→ ¬O(¬A/C)
added (hence the name PD).7
3.2 Deontic operators for conditional imperatives
Unlike their unconditional counterparts, conditional imperatives have been found
hard to reason about. G. H. von Wright [47] called conditional norms the “touch-
stone of normative logic”, and van Fraassen [10] wrote with regard to logics for
conditional imperatives: “There may be systematic relations governing this moral
dynamics, but I can only profess ignorance of them.”
Representing a conditional imperative as an unconditional imperative that
demands a material conditional to be made true yields undesired results. Most
notorious is the problem of contraposition: consider a set I with the only imper-
ative !(p1 → p2), meaning e.g. ‘if the police stops you, show your drivers licence’.
(td -d1) makes true O(p2/p1), but also O(¬p1/¬p2), so if you can’t present your
drivers licence (you don’t have one) you must see to it that the police does not
stop you, which is hardly what the speaker meant you to do.One may think
that such problems arise from the fact that antecedents of conditional impera-
tives often describe states of the affairs that the agent is not supposed to, and
often cannot, control. But consider the set {!(p1 → p2), !(¬p1 → p3)}, it yields
O(p2/¬p3) with (td -d1). Here, p2 is what the consequent of some imperative
demands, so it supposedly describes something the agent can control. Now let
7 For proofs, and an additional “credulous ought” that defines O(A/C) true if the
truth of A is required to satisfy all imperatives in some ¬C-remainder, cf. my [14].
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the imperatives be interpreted as ordering me to wear my best suit if it does not
rain, and a rain coat if it does: it is clear nonsense that I am obliged to wear
a raincoat given that I can’t wear my best suit (e.g. it is in the laundry). Such
problems are the reason why we cautiously use special models for conditional
imperatives (i.e. conditional imperative structures), and write p1⇒!p2 instead of
!(p1 → p2). But this only delegates the problem from the level of representation
to that of semantics, where now new truth definitions must be found.
Let I = 〈I, f, g〉 be a conditional imperative structure, and let us ignore for
the moment the further complication of possible conflicts between imperatives.
Then the following seems a natural way to define what ought to be the case in
circumstances where C is assumed to be true:
(td -cd1) I |= O(A/C) iff [TriggeredI({C}, I)]f `PL A
So dyadic obligation is defined in terms what is necessary to satisfy all imper-
atives that are triggered in the assumed circumstances. E.g. if I = {p1⇒!p2},
with its only imperative interpreted as “if you have a cold, stay in bed”, then
O(p2/p1) truly states that I must stay in bed given that I have a cold.
Like in the unconditional case, it seems important to be able to use ‘cir-
cumstantial reasoning’, i.e. employ the information about the situation not only
to determine if an imperative is triggered, but also for reasoning with its con-
sequent. E.g. if the set of imperatives is {p1⇒!(p2 ∨ p3)}, with its imperative
interpreted as expressing “if you have a cold, either stay in bed or wear a scarf”,
one would like to obtain O(p3/p1∧¬p2), expressing that given that I have a cold
and don’t stay in bed, I must wear a scarf. So (td -cd1) may be changed into
(td -cd2) I |= O(A/C) iff [TriggeredI({C}, I)]f ∪ {C} `PL A.
Though the step from (td -cd1) to (td -cd2) seems quite reasonable, such defini-
tions have also been criticized for defining the assumed circumstances as oblig-
atory. E.g. if the set of imperatives is {p1⇒!p2}, where the imperative is inter-
preted as expressing “if you hit someone, apologize to him”, then (td-5) makes
true O(p1 ∧ p2/p1), and hence also O(p1/p1), so given that I hit someone, this
is something I ought to do. The criticism looses much of its edge in the present
setting, where one can point to the distinction between imperatives (there is no
imperative that demands p1) and ought sentences that describe what must be
true when all triggered imperatives are satisfied in the supposed circumstances:
then the truth of O(p1/p1) seems no more paradoxical than the truth of O>
that is accepted in most systems of deontic logic.
3.3 Further modifications
In Makinson & van der Torre’s [25] more general theory of ‘input/output logic’,
(td -cd1) is termed ‘simple-minded output’, and (td -cd2) is its ‘throughput ver-
sion’.8As the names suggests, the authors also discuss more refined operations,
which again might be considered for reasoning about conditional imperatives.
One modification addresses the possibility of ‘reasoning by cases’ that e.g. makes
8 If I resembles the generating set G of input/output logic, then O(A/C) means that
A is an output given the input C (Makinson & van der Torre write A ∈ out(G, {C})).
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true O(p2 ∨ p4/p1 ∨ p3) for a set of imperatives I = {p1⇒!p2, p3⇒!p4}. This may
be achieved by the following definition, where LPL⊥¬C is the set of all maximal
subsets of the language LPL that are consistent with C:9
(td -cd3) I |= O(A/C) iff ∀V ∈ LPL⊥¬C : [TriggeredI(V, I)]f `PL A
In the example, each set V ⊂ LPL that is maximally consistent with p1 ∨ p3
either contains p1, then p1⇒!p2 is triggered and so p2 and also p2 ∨ p4 is implied
by [TriggeredI(V, I)]f , or it contains ¬p1, but then it cannot also contain ¬p3
and so must contain p3, so p3⇒!p4 is triggered and therefore p4 and also p2 ∨ p4
implied, so for all sets V , p2 ∨ p4 is implied and so O(p2 ∨ p4/p1 ∨ p3) made true.
In order to add ‘circumstantial reasoning’ to (td -cd3) – or, in Makinson &
van der Torre’s terms, for its ‘throughput version’ –, one might, in the vein of
(td -d2) and (td -cd2), try this definition:
(td -cd4−) I |= O(A/C) iff ∀V ∈ LPL⊥¬C : [TriggeredI(V, I)]f ∪ {C} `PL A
But the definition seems too weak. Consider the set {p1⇒!(¬p2 ∨ p4), p3⇒!p4}
and the situation (p1 ∧ p2)∨ p3. We would expect a reasoning as follows: in this
situation, either p1∧p2 is true, so the first imperative is triggered but we cannot
satisfy it by bringing about ¬p2, and so must bring about p4. Or p3 is true, then
the second imperative is triggered and we must again bring about p4. So we
must bring about p4 in the given situation. But the definition fails to make true
O(p4/(p1 ∧ p2)∨ p3). Like Makinson and van der Torre [25], I therefore combine
reasoning by cases with a stronger version of throughput:
(td -cd4) I |= O(A/C) iff ∀V ∈ LPL⊥¬C : [TriggeredI(V, I)]f ∪ V `PL A
As is easy to see, this resolves the difficulty: for {p1⇒!(¬p2 ∨ p4), p3⇒!p4},
O(p4/(p1 ∧ p2) ∨ p3) is now true, as desired. However, this modification has a
surprising consequence: it makes the reasoning about conditional imperatives
collapse into reasoning about consequences of their materializations:
Observation 1 By (td-cd4), I |= O(A/C) iff m(I) ∪ {C} `PL A.
Proof. For the right-to-left direction, for any imperative i ∈ I and any set
V ∈ LPL⊥¬C, either V includes g(i), so i ∈ TriggeredI(V, I) and therefore
[TriggeredI(V, I)]f `PL g(i) → f(i), or it does not include g(i), but then it in-
cludes ¬g(i) by maximality, hence V `PL g(i) → f(i). So [TriggeredI(V, I)]f ∪
V `PL g(i) → f(i). For the left-to-right direction, if m(I) ∪ {C} 0PL A then
m(I)∪{C}∪{¬A} is consistent, so there is a V ∈ LPL⊥¬C such thatm(I)∪{C}∪
{¬A} ⊆ V . It is immediate that for each i ∈ TriggeredI(V, I), m(I)∪V `PL f(i),
so if [TriggeredI(V, I)]f ∪ V `PL A then m(I) ∪ V `PL A and since m(I) ⊆ V
also V `PL A. Since V was consistent and included ¬A, it cannot also derive A,
and so by contraposition [TriggeredI(V, I)]f ∪ V 0PL A.
But such an equivalence makes all the problems discussed above for identifying
conditional imperatives with unconditional imperatives that demand their mate-
9 Makinson & van der Torre’s [25] call the resulting operator ‘basic output’, of which
a syntactical version was first presented by S´wirydowicz [41] p. 32.
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rializations reappear, in particular the problem of contraposition.10 So it seems
we must choose between ‘reasoning by cases’ and ‘circumstantial reasoning’.11
Another modification that these authors consider is that of ‘reusable output’:
when an imperative is triggered that demands A, and A is the trigger for some
imperative A⇒!B, then we also ought to do B. Such a modification can easily
be incorporated into a truth definition and its ‘throughput’ version:
(td -cd5) I |= O(A/C) iff [Triggered∗I({C}, I)]f `PL A
(td -cd6) I |= O(A/C) iff [Triggered∗I({C}, I)]f ∪ {C} `PL A
where Triggered∗I(W,Γ ) means the smallest subset of Γ ⊆ I such that for all i ∈
Γ , if [Triggered∗I(W,Γ )]
f ∪W `PL g(i) then i ∈ Triggered∗I(W,Γ ). Moreover, the
two modifications of ‘reasoning by cases’ and ‘reusable output’ can be combined
to produce the following definition and its ‘throughput’ variant:
(td -cd7) I |= O(A/C) iff ∀V ∈ LPL⊥¬C : [Triggered∗I(V, I)]f `PL A
(td -cd8) I |= O(A/C) iff ∀V ∈ LPL⊥¬C : [Triggered∗I(V, I)]f ∪ V `PL A
The topic of ‘reusable output’ is discussed under the name of ‘deontic detach-
ment’ in the literature on deontic logic, and there is no agreement whether such
a procedure is admissible (Makinson [24] p. 43 argues in favor, whereas Sven Ove
Hansson [17] p. 155 disagrees). E.g. let I = {!p1, p1⇒!p2,¬p1⇒!¬p2}, and for its
interpretation assume that it is imperative for the proper execution of your job
that you develop novel methods, which make you eligible for a bonus, and that
if you develop such novel methods you owe it to yourself to apply for the bonus,
but that if you don’t develop such methods you must not apply for the bonus.
Truth definitions that accept ‘deontic detachment’ make true O(p2/>), and so
tell us that you ought to apply for the bonus, which seems weird since it may
be that you never invent anything. However, proponents of deontic detachment
may argue that in such a situation, O(p1 ∧ p2/>) should hold, i.e. you ought to
invent new methods and apply for the bonus, and that the reluctance to also
accept O(p2/>) is – like the inference from “you ought to put on your parachute
and jump” to “you ought to jump” – just a variant of Ross’ Paradox that is
usually considered harmless.
For (td -cd7) we once again obtain O(p2/¬p3) for I = {p1⇒!p2,¬p1⇒!p3}:
for any V ∈ LPL⊥p3, ¬p3 ∈ V , furthermore either p1 ∈ V and so p1⇒!p2 ∈
Triggered∗I(V, I), or ¬p1 ∈ V , then ¬p1⇒!p3 ∈ Triggered∗I(V, I), and since {p3}∪
10 (td-cd4−) does not fare much better: though it does not include contraposition, it
again makes O(p2/¬p3) true for I = {p1⇒!p2,¬p1⇒!p3}, which is counterintuitive.
11 Legal use of ‘reasoning by cases’, orWahlfeststellung, is controversial. It means that if
the defendant either committed crime α or crime β, the defendant would be convicted
according to the milder law. A proponent would argue that since the defendant
committed a crime (though it remains open which), justice demands that he should
not go free, while the defense would argue that this violates the in dubio pro reo
principle, since neither charge is sufficiently proved. After a Reichsgericht ruling in
1934 allowedWahlfeststellung for cases in which the crimes in question were ‘ethically
and psychologically equivalent’, the national-socialist lawmakers introduced a law
prescribing its unrestricted application in 1935, considered ideological and lifted
again by the Allied Control Council of Germany in 1946 (cf. [43]).
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{¬p3} `PL p1, again p1⇒!p2 is in Triggered∗I(V, I), hence [Triggered∗I(V, I)]f `PL
p2 for all V ∈ LPL⊥p3. But as we saw above, when interpreting the imperatives
as ‘if it rains, wear a raincoat’ and ‘if it does not rain, wear your best jacket’,
this result seems counterintuitive.12 Note that (td -cd8) is again equivalent to
I |= O(A/C) iff m(I) ∪ {C} `PL A and thus to (td -cd4) (cf. Makinson & van
der Torre [25] observation 16; [26], p. 156):
Observation 2 By (td-cd8), I |= O(A/C) iff m(I) ∪ {C} `PL A.
Proof. Similar to the proof of observation 1. For the left-to-right direction, use
that for each i ∈ Triggered∗I(V, I), m(I) ∪ V `PL f(i), which is immediate.
3.4 Operators for prioritized conditional imperatives
This paper focuses on prioritized conditional imperatives, and for these there
is a further hurdle to finding the proper truth definitions for deontic concepts.
Priorities are only required if the imperatives cannot all be obeyed – otherwise
there is no reason not to obey all, and the priority ordering is not used. So the
truth definitions must be able to deliver meaningful results for possibly conflict-
ing imperatives. The intuitive idea is to use the information in the ordering to
choose subsets of the set of imperatives under consideration that contain only
the more important imperatives and leave out less important, conflicting ones,
so that the resulting ‘preferred subset’ (or rather, subsets, since the choice may
not always be determined by the ordering) only contains imperatives that do not
conflict in the given situation. More generally, let I be a prioritized conditional
imperative structure 〈I, g, f,<〉, and let ∆ be a subset of I. Then PI(W,∆)
contains just the subsets of ∆ that are thus preferred given the world facts W .
The above truth definitions can then be adapted such that they now describe
something as obligatory iff it is so with respect to all the preferred subsets of
the imperatives, i.e. they take on the following forms:
(td -pcd1) I |= O(A/C) iff ∀Γ ∈PI({C}, I) :
(td -pcd1) [TriggeredI({C}, Γ )]f `PL A ,
(td -pcd2) [TriggeredI({C}, Γ )]f ∪ {C} `PL A ,
(td -pcd3) ∀V ∈ LPL⊥¬C : [TriggeredI(V, Γ )]f `PL A ,
(td -pcd4) ∀V ∈ LPL⊥¬C : [TriggeredI(V, Γ )]f ∪ V `PL A ,
(td -pcd5) [Triggered∗I({C}, Γ )]f `PL A ,
(td -pcd6) [Triggered∗I({C}, Γ )]f ∪ {C} `PL A ,
(td -pcd7) ∀V ∈ LPL⊥¬C : [Triggered∗I(V, Γ )]f `PL A ,
(td -pcd8) ∀V ∈ LPL⊥¬C : [Triggered∗I(V, Γ )]f ∪ V `PL A .
So e.g. (td -pcd1) defines A as obligatory if the truth of A is required to satisfy the
triggered imperatives in any preferred subset. Of course, the crucial and as yet
missing element is the decision procedure that determines the set PI({C}, I)
of preferred subsets. The next section discusses several proposals to define such
subsets; a new proposal is presented in the section that follows it.
12 With respect to their out4-operation that corresponds to (td-cd7), Makinson & van
der Torre [25] speak of a ‘ghostly contraposition’.
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4 Identifying the Preferred Subsets
4.1 Brewka’s preferred subtheories
The idea that normative conflicts can be overcome by use of a priority ordering
of the norms involved dates back at least to Ross [37] and is also most prominent
in von Wright’s work (cf. [45] p. 68, 80). However, it has turned out to be difficult
to determine the exact mechanism by which such a resolution of conflicts can be
achieved. This is true even when only unconditional imperatives are considered,
and when special problems are left out of the picture, such that the ordering
itself might be dependent on the facts (e.g. when the command of an officer in
the field may override that of her superior due to unexpected circumstances), or
be the subject of normative regulation (e.g. when we are commanded to obey
the law of God more than the law of man). Discussing various proposals for
resolution of conflicts between unconditional imperative, I have argued in [15]
that an ‘incremental’ definition be used for determining the relevant subsets.
Based on earlier methods by Rescher [34], such a definition was first introduced
by Brewka [4] for reasoning with prioritized defaults. For any priority relation <,
the idea is to consider all the ‘full prioritizations’ ≺ of < (strict well orders that
preserve <), and then work ones way from top to bottom by adding the ≺-next-
higher imperative to the thus constructed ‘preferred subtheory’ if its demand is
consistent with the given facts and the demands of the imperatives that were
added before. For the present setting, the definition can be given as follows:
Definition 1 (Brewka’s preferred subtheories).
Let I = 〈I, f, g,<〉 be a prioritized conditional imperative structure, ∆ be a
subset of I, and W ⊆ LPL be a set of PL-sentences. Then Γ ∈ PBI (W,∆) iff
(i) W 0PL ⊥, and (ii) Γ is obtained from a full prioritization ≺ by defining
Γ[≺↓i] =
{⋃
j≺ i Γ[≺↓j] ∪ {i} if W ∪ [
⋃
j≺ i Γ[≺↓j] ∪ {i}]f 0PL ⊥, and⋃
j≺ i Γ[≺↓j] otherwise,
for any i ∈ ∆, and letting Γ = ⋃i∈∆ Γ[≺↓i].
Clause (i) ensures that for an inconsistent set of assumed ‘facts’, no set is pre-
ferred. Somewhat roundabout, owed to the possibility of infinite ascending sub-
chains, clause (ii) then recursively defines a set Γ ∈ PBI (W,∆) for each full
prioritization ≺: take the ≺-first i (the exclusion of infinite descending sub-
chains guarantees that it exists) and if W ∪ {if} 0PL ⊥ then let Γ[≺↓i] = {i};
otherwise Γ[≺↓i] is left empty.13 Similarly, any ≺-later i is tested for possible
addition to the set
⋃
j≺ i Γ[≺↓j] of elements that were added in the step for a
j ∈ ∆ that occurs ≺-prior to i. Γ is then the union of all these sets.
To see how this definition works, consider the set I = {!(p1∨p2), !¬p2, !¬p1},
with the ranking !(p1 ∨ p2) < !¬p1 and !¬p2 < !¬p1. For an interpretation, let
!(p1 ∨ p2)) be your mother’s request that you buy cucumbers or spinach for
dinner, !¬p1 be your father’s wish that no cucumbers are bought, and !¬p2 your
13 As usual, the union of an empty set of sets is taken to be the empty set.
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sister’s desire that you don’t buy any spinach. We have two full prioritizations
!(p1 ∨ p2) < !¬p2 < !¬p1 and !¬p2 < !(p1 ∨ p2) < !¬p1 – let these be termed ≺1
and ≺2, respectively. The construction for ≺1 adds the imperative !(p1∨p2) in the
first step and, since no conflict with the situation arises, !¬p2 in the second step.
In the third and last step, nothing is added since !¬p1 conflicts with the demands
of the already added imperatives. For ≺2 the only difference is that the first two
imperatives are added in inverse order. Thus PBI (W, I) = {{!(p1 ∨ p2), !¬p2}}.
Using (td -pcd2) we obtain O(p1 ∧ ¬p2/>), which means that you have to buy
spinach and not cucumbers, thus fulfilling your parents’ requests but not your
sister’s, which seems reasonable.
As I showed in [15], Brewka’s method is extremely successful for dealing
with unconditional imperatives. It is provably equivalent for such imperatives to
methods proposed by Ryan [38] and Sakama & Inoue [39], and it avoids problems
of other approaches by Alchourro´n & Makinson [2], Prakken [31] and Prakken
& Sartor [32]. Moreover, an equally intuitive maximization method proposed
by Nebel [29], [30], that adds first a maximal number of the highest-ranking
imperatives, then a maximal number of the second-ranking imperatives, etc., but
for its construction requires the ordering to be based on a complete preorder, can
be shown to be embedded in Brewka’s approach for such orderings. So my aim
will be to retain Brewka’s method for the unconditional case. However, when it
is applied without change to conditional imperatives, the algorithm may lead to
incorrect results. E.g. consider a set I with two equally ranking imperatives {p1⇒
!p2,¬p1⇒!¬p2}, meaning e.g. “if you go out, wear your boots” and “if you don’t
go out, don’t wear your boots”. Since the consequents contradict each other,
an unmodified application of Brewka’s method produces PBI ({p1}, I) = {{p1⇒
!p2}, {¬p1⇒!¬p2}}, which fails to make true O(p2/p1) by any truth definition
(td -pcd1-8): the right set contains no imperatives that are in any way triggered
by p1. So we cannot derive that you ought to wear your boots, given that you are
going out. But intuitively there is no conflict, since the conflicting obligations
arise in mutually exclusive circumstances only.
4.2 A na¨ıve approach
A straightforward way to adopt Brewka’s method to the case of conditional
imperatives is to use not all imperatives for the construction, but only those
that are triggered by the facts W , i.e. to use TriggeredI(W,∆) instead of ∆:
Definition 2 (The na¨ıve approach).
Let I = 〈I, f, g,<〉 be a prioritized conditional imperative structure, ∆ be a
subset of I, and W ⊆ LPL be a set of PL-sentences. Then Γ ∈ PnI (W,∆) iff
Γ ∈PBI (W,TriggeredI(W,∆)).
The change resolves our earlier problems with Brewka’s method: consider again
the set of imperatives {p1⇒!p2,¬p1⇒!¬p2}, where the imperatives were inter-
preted as ordering me to wear my boots when I go out, and not wear my boots
when I don’t. The new definition produces PnI ({p1}, I) = {{p1⇒!p2}}, its only
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‘preferred’ subset containing just the one imperative that is triggered given the
facts {p1}. By any truth definition (td -pcd1-8), O(p2/p1) is now defined true, so
given that you go out, you ought to wear your boots, which is as it should be.
The na¨ıve approach is clearly a conservative extension of Brewka’s origi-
nal method to conditional imperatives: for sets ∆ of unconditional imperatives,
TriggeredI({>},∆) = ∆. It is similar to Horty’s proposal in [21] in that con-
flicts are only removed between imperatives that are triggered (though the exact
mechanism differs from Horty’s). When I nevertheless call it ‘na¨ıve’, this is be-
cause there are conceivable counterexamples to this method. Consider the set
of imperatives {!p1, p1⇒!p2, !¬p2}, ranked !p1 < p1⇒!p2 < !¬p2, and for an
interpretation suppose that your job requires you to go outside p1, that your
mother, who is concerned for your health, told you to wear a scarf p2 if you
go outside, and that your friends don’t want you to wear a scarf, whether you
go outside or not. In the default situation > only the first imperative and the
third are triggered, i.e. TriggeredI({>}, I) = {!p1, !¬p2}. Since their demands
are consistent with each other, we obtainPnI ({>}, I) = {{!p1, !¬p2}}, for which
all truth definitions (td -pcd1-8) make O(p1 ∧ ¬p2/>) true. So you ought to go
out and not wear a scarf, thus satisfying the first and the third imperative, but
violating the second-ranking imperative. But arguably, if an imperative is to be
violated, it should not be the second-ranking p1⇒!p2, but the lowest ranking
!¬p2 instead.
4.3 The stepwise approach
To avoid the difficulties of the ‘na¨ıve’ approach, it seems we must not just take
into account the imperatives that are triggered, but also those that become trig-
gered when higher ranking imperatives are satisfied. To this effect, the following
modification may seem reasonable:
Definition 3 (The stepwise approach).
Let I = 〈I, f, g,<〉 be a prioritized conditional imperative structure, ∆ be a
subset of I, and W ⊆ LPL be a set of PL-sentences. Then Γ ∈Ps(W,∆) iff (i)
W 0PL ⊥, and (ii) Γ is obtained from a full prioritization ≺ by defining
Γ[≺↓i] =
{⋃
j≺ i Γ[≺↓j] ∪ {i} if i ∈ SatisfiableI(W ∪ [
⋃
j≺ i Γ[≺↓j]]
f ,∆), and⋃
j≺ i Γ[≺↓j] otherwise,
for any i ∈ ∆, and letting Γ = ⋃i∈∆ Γ[≺↓i].
So at each step one considers what happens if the imperatives that were included
so far are satisfied, and adds the current imperative only if it is satisfiable given
the truth of W and the satisfaction of these previous imperatives. Note that
satisfiability of an imperative, like its satisfaction and violation, presupposes that
the imperative is triggered. In contrast to the na¨ıve approach, the new definition
not only includes, at each step, those imperatives that are triggered and can be
satisfied given the facts and the supposed satisfaction of the previously added
imperatives: it also includes those that become triggered when a previously added
imperative is satisfied.
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The modification avoids the previous difficulty: consider again the set of
imperatives {!p1, p1⇒!p2, !¬p2}, with the ranking !p1 < p1⇒!p2 < !¬p2. There
is just one full prioritization, which for W = {>} yields in the first step the set
{!p1}, and in the second step {!p1, p1⇒!p2}, since p1⇒!p2 is triggered when the
previously added imperative !p1 is assumed to be satisfied. In the third step,
nothing is added: though the imperative !¬p2 is triggered, it cannot be satisfied
together with the previously added imperatives. So we obtain PsI({>}, I) =
{{!p1, p1⇒!p2}}, and hence O(p1/>), but not O(p1 ∧ ¬!p2/>), is defined true
by all of (td -pcd1-8). Operators that accept ‘deontic detachment’ (as defined by
td -pcd5-8) even make true O(p1 ∧ p2/>), and so in the given interpretation you
must go out and wear a scarf, which now is as it should be.
However, a small change in the ordering shows that this definition does not
suffice: let the imperatives now be ranked p1⇒!p2 < !p1 < !¬p2. (For the inter-
pretation, assume that the conditional imperative to wear a scarf when leaving
the house was uttered by some high-ranking authority, e.g. a doctor.) Then again
PsI({>}, I) = {{!p1, !¬p2}}: in the first step, nothing is added since p1⇒!p2 is
neither triggered by the facts nor by the assumed satisfaction of previously added
imperatives (there are none). In the next two steps, !p1 and !¬p2 are added, as
each is consistent with the facts and the satisfaction of the previously added im-
peratives. So again all of (td -pcd1-8) make true O(p1∧¬p2/>), i.e. you ought to
go out and not wear a scarf, satisfying the second and third ranking imperatives
at the expense of the highest ranking one. But surely, if one must violate an
imperative, it should be one of the lower-ranking ones instead.
4.4 The reconsidering approach
The merits of the stepwise approach were that it did not only consider the
imperatives that are triggered, but also those that become triggered when already
added imperatives are satisfied. Such considerations applied to those imperatives
that follow in the procedure. Yet the satisfaction of already added imperatives
might also trigger higher-ranking imperatives, which by this method are not
considered again. So it seems necessary, at each step, to reconsider also the
higher-ranking imperatives. An algorithm that does that was first introduced
for default theory by Marek & Truszczyn´ski [28] p. 72, and later employed by
Brewka in [5]; it can be reformulated for the present setting as follows:
Definition 4 (The reconsidering approach).
Let I = 〈I, f, g,<〉 be a prioritized conditional imperative structure, ∆ be a
subset of I, and W ⊆ LPL be a set of PL-sentences. Then Γ ∈PrI(W,∆) iff (i)
W 0PL ⊥, and (ii) Γ is obtained from a full prioritization ≺ by defining
Γi =
⋃
j≺ i Γβ ∪ min≺[SatisfiableI(W ∪ [
⋃
j≺ i Γj ]
f ,∆) \⋃j≺ i Γj ]
for i ∈ ∆, and letting Γ = ⋃i∈∆ Γi.
The definition reconsiders at each step the whole ordering, and adds the ≺-first14
imperative that has not been added previously and is satisfiable given both the
14 For any ordering < on some set Γ , min<Γ = {i ∈ Γ | ∀i′ ∈ Γ : if i′ 6= i, then i′ ≮ i},
and max<Γ = {i ∈ Γ | ∀i′ ∈ Γ : if i′ 6= i, then i ≮ i′}, as usual.
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circumstances C and the consequents of the previously added imperatives. Note
that in ‘Γi’, i is used just as a index – it does not mean that i is considered
for addition to the set at this step, and in fact it may be added at an earlier
or later step (or not at all). To see how the definition works, consider again the
example which the stepwise approach failed, i.e. the set of imperatives {!p1, p1⇒
!p2, !¬p2}, with the ranking p1⇒!p2 < !p1 < !¬p2. We are interested in the
preferred sets for the default circumstances >, i.e. the sets in PrI({>}, I). I is
already fully prioritized, so there is just one such set. Applying the algorithm, we
find the minimal (highest ranking) element in SatisfiableI({>}, I) is !p1, so this
element is added in the first step. In the second step, we look for the minimal
element in SatisfiableI({>} ∪ {!p1}f , I), other than the previously added !p1. It
is p1⇒!p2, since the assumed satisfaction of all previously added imperatives
triggers it, and its consequent can be true together with {>} ∪ {p1}. So p1⇒
!p2 is added in this step. In the remaining third step, nothing is added: !¬p2
is not in SatisfiableI({>} ∪ {!p1, p1⇒!p2}f , I), and all other elements in this
set have been previously added. So PrI({>}, I) = {{!p1, p1⇒!p2}}. Now all
truth definitions (td -pcd1-8) make true O(p1/>), but not O(p1 ∧ ¬!p2/>), and
operators that accept ‘deontic detachment’ make true O(p1 ∧ p2/>). So, in the
given interpretation, you must go out (as your job requires) and wear a scarf (as
the doctor ordered you to do in case you go out), which is as it should be.
However, again problems remain. Reconsider the set {!p1, p1⇒!p2, !¬p2}, but
let the ranking now be p1⇒!p2 < !¬p2 < !p1. Let p1⇒!p2 stand for the doc-
tor’s order to wear a scarf when going outside, let !¬p2 stand for your friends’
expectation that you don’t wear a scarf, and let !p1 represent your sister’s
wish that you leave the house. Construct the set in PrI({>}, I) – since I re-
mains fully prioritized, there is again just one such set. The minimal element in
SatisfiableI({>}, I) is !¬p2, and so is added in the first step. The minimal ele-
ment in SatisfiableI({>}∪{!¬p2}f , I), other than !¬p2, is !p1 which therefore gets
added in the second step. Nothing is added in the remaining step: !¬p2 and !p1
have already been added, and p1⇒!p2 is not in SatisfiableI({>}∪{!¬p2, !p1}f , I):
though it is triggered by the assumed satisfaction of !p1, its consequent is con-
tradicted by the assumed satisfaction of !¬p2. So PrI({>}, I) = {{!p1, !¬p2}}.
Hence all truth definitions (td -pcd1-8) again makes true O(p1 ∧ ¬p2/>), so you
ought to go out without a scarf, again satisfying the second and third ranking
imperatives at the expense of the first, which seems the wrong solution.
4.5 The fixpoint approach
To eliminate cases in which the ‘reconsidering approach’ still adds imperatives
that can only be satisfied at the expense of violating a higher-ranking one, a
‘fixpoint’ approach may seem adequate. Such an approach was first proposed for
default reasoning by Brewka & Eiter [6]. It tests each set that may be considered
as preferred to see if it really includes all the elements that should be included:
imperatives that are triggered given the facts and the assumed satisfaction of all
imperatives in the set, and would be added by Brewka’s [4] original method that
adds the higher ranking imperatives first. The procedure translates as follows:
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Definition 5 (The fixpoint approach).
Let I = 〈I, f, g,<〉 be a prioritized conditional imperative structure, ∆ be a
subset of I, and W ⊆ LPL be a set of PL-sentences. Then
Γ ∈P fI(W,∆) iff Γ ∈PBI (W,TriggeredI(W ∪ Γ f ,∆)).
To see how this definition works, consider the above set of imperatives I =
{!p1, p1⇒!p2, !¬p2}, with the ranking p1⇒!p2 < !¬p2 < !p1. It is immediate
that the set {!p1, !¬p2} cannot be inP fI({>}, I): if we assume all imperatives in
this set to be satisfied, then all imperatives are triggered, i.e. TriggeredI({>} ∪
{!p1, !¬p2}f , I) = I. By Brewka’s original method,PBI (W, I) = {{p1⇒!p2, !p1}}:
< is already fully prioritized, and for this full prioritization the method adds
p1⇒!p2 in the first step, !¬p2 cannot be added in the second step since its
consequent contradicts the consequent of the previously added p1⇒!p2, and in
the third step !p1 is added. So since the considered set {!p1, !¬p2} is not in
PBI (W, I), it is not a ‘fixpoint’. Rather, as may be checked, the only ‘fixpoint’ in
P fI({>}, I) is {p1⇒!p2, !p1}. For this set all truth definitions (td -pcd1-8) make
true O(p1/>), but no longer O(p1∧¬p2/>). Moreover, truth definitions like (td -
pcd5-8) that allow ‘deontic detachment’ make true O(p1 ∧ p2/>). In the given
interpretation this means that you must leave the house at your sisters request
and wear a scarf, as the doctor ordered you to do in case you go out.
Though the construction now no longer makes trueO(p1∧¬p2/>), its solution
for the example, that determines the set {p1⇒!p2, !p1} as the fixpoint of the set
of imperatives {!p1, p1⇒!p2, !¬p2} with the ranking p1⇒!p2 < !¬p2 < !p1, seems
questionable. Though this now includes the doctor’s order, you now have no
obligation anymore to satisfy the imperative that is second ranking, i.e. your
friends’ request that you don’t wear a scarf; truth definitions (td -pcd4-8) even
oblige you to violate it by wearing a scarf. Now consider the situation without
the third ranking imperative !p1: it can easily be verified that for a set I =
{p1⇒!p2, !¬p2} the only fixpoint in P fI({>}, I) is {!¬p2}. So for the reduced
set, (td -pcd2) makes true O(¬p2/>), i.e. you ought to obey your friends’ wish.
That the satisfaction of this higher ranking imperative !¬p2 should no longer be
obligatory when a lower ranking imperative !p1 is added, seems hard to explain.
If the ranking is taken seriously, I think one should still satisfy the higher ranking
imperatives, regardless of what lower ranking imperatives are added.
However, there is another, perhaps even more severe problem with the fix-
point approach.15 Consider a new set of imperatives {p1⇒!p2, !(p1 ∧ ¬p2), !p3},
with the ranking p1⇒!p2 < !(p1 ∧ ¬p2) < !p3. For an interpretation, let the first
imperative be again the doctor’s order to wear a scarf in case you go out, the
second one be your friends’ request to go out and not wear a scarf, and the third
ranking imperative be the wish of your aunt that you write her a letter. Try to
find a fixpoint for the default circumstances, i.e. some Γ ∈P fI({>}, I): either Γ
contains the highest ranking imperative p1⇒!p2 or it does not. If Γ contains it,
then p1⇒!p2 must be in TriggeredI({>} ∪ Γ f , I). It can only be in there if also
!(p1 ∧¬p2) is in Γ , for otherwise p1⇒!p2 could not be triggered. But no set that
15 Both problems also arise for a new fixpoint approach by John F. Horty in [22].
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is constructed by Brewka’s method can include both of these imperatives, since
their consequents contradict each other. So Γ does not contain p1⇒!p2, contrary
to our assumption. So assume Γ does not contain p1⇒!p2. Whatever Γ is like,
TriggeredI({>} ∪ Γ f , I) includes !(p1 ∧ ¬p2). By Brewka’s method, !(p1 ∧ ¬p2)
will only not be added to the set Γ ∈ PBI ({>},TriggeredI({>} ∪ Γ f , I)) if the
consequents of previously added imperatives conflict with its consequent – but
the only higher ranking imperative is p1⇒!p2 and we already established that it
is not in Γ . So !(p1∧¬p2) is in Γ . But then p1⇒!p2 is in TriggeredI({>}∪Γ f , I),
and so is added to Γ in the first step of the construction, contrary to the as-
sumption that it is not in Γ . So there is a reductio ad absurdum for both possible
cases, hence there can be no Γ ∈P fI({>}, I), i.e. there is no fixpoint. So there is
also no fixpoint that contains !p3, and hence none of the truth definitions make
O(p3/>) true, and so you do not even have to write to your aunt. But even if the
presence of both a higher ranking conditional imperative and a lower ranking,
unconditional imperative to violate it poses a problem (why should it? after all,
the lower ranking imperative is outranked), it is hard to see why the subject
should be left off the hook for all other, completely unrelated obligations.16
4.6 Discussion
For a discussion of our results so far, let us return to the ‘drinking and driving’
example from the introduction. Let the three imperatives:
(1) Your mother says: if you drink anything, then don’t drive.
(2) Your best friend says: if you go to the party, then you do the driving.
(3) Some acquaintance says: if you go to the party, then have a drink with me.
be represented by a prioritized conditional imperative structure I = 〈I, f, g,<〉,
where I = {(p1⇒!¬p2, p3⇒!p2, p3⇒!p1} and p1⇒!¬p2 < p3⇒!p2 < p3⇒!p1. Let
the set of facts be {p3}, i.e. you go to the party. As we noted, Brewka’s original
method is not tailored to be directly employed to conditional imperatives. The
next three approaches, the na¨ıve, the stepwise and the reconsidering ones, pro-
duce PnI ({p3}, I) = PsI({p3}, I) = PrI({p3}, I) = {{p3⇒!p2, p3⇒!p1}}, which
by all truth definitions (td -pcd1-8) makes true O(p1 ∧ p2/p3), so you ought to
drink and drive. The fixpoint approach producesP fI({p3}, I) = {{p1⇒!¬p2, p3⇒
!p1}}, so all truth definitions make true O(p1/p3), which means you ought to
drink. Truth definition with ‘deontic detachment’ like (td -pcd5-8) additionally
make true O(p1 ∧¬p2/p3), so you ought to drink and not drive. But the natural
reaction is to ignore the third ranking imperative and drive, as your best friend
asked you to do. So it seems we have to look for a different solution.
16 An independent approach by Makinson in [24], which, however, only considers non-
prioritized conditionals, also fails in this case: for the default circumstances > it
produces the set {!(p1 ∧ ¬p2), !p3}. p1⇒!p2 is not considered, since its only ‘la-
bel’ (roughly: a conjunction of the circumstances, the imperatives’ antecedents that
would trigger∗ it, and its consequent) is inconsistent (it is >∧ (p1∧¬p2)∧p2). But it
is requires explanation why the agent should not be allowed to obey p1⇒!p2, rather
than having to violate it by satisfying !(p1 ∧ ¬p2).
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Before we do that, I will, however, question again our intuition in this mat-
ter. John F. Horty [22] has recently used a structurally similar example to argue
for just the opposite, that the solution by the fixpoint approach is correct, i.e.
that (in our example) you should drink and not drive. His example is that of
three commands, uttered by a colonel, a major and a captain to a soldier, Cor-
poral O’Reilly. The Colonel, who does not like it too warm in the cabin, orders
O’Reilly to open the window whenever the heat is turned on. The Major, who is
a conservationist, wants O’Reilly to keep the window closed during the winter.
And the Captain, who does not like it to be cold, orders O’Reilly to turn the
heat on during the winter. The intended representation is again the prioritized
conditional imperative structure employed above for the ‘drinking and driving’
example, where p1 now means that the heat is turned on, p2 means that the
window is closed, and p3 means that it is winter. As we have seen, the fixpoint
approach yields the preferred subset {p1⇒!¬p2, p3⇒!p1}, making true O(p1/p3)
with (td -pcd1-3), and O(p1∧¬p2/p3) with (td -pcd4-8), so O’Reilly must turn on
the heat and then open the window, and thus violate the Major’s order. Horty
argues as follows in support of the choice of this set:
“O’Reilly’s job is to obey the orders he has been given exactly as they
have been issued. If he fails to obey an order issued by an officer without
an acceptable excuse, he will be court-martialed. And, let us suppose,
there is only one acceptable excuse for failing to obey such an order:
that obeying the order would, in the situation, involve disobeying an
order issued by an officer of equal or higher rank. (...) So given the set
of commands that O’Reilly has been issued, can he, in fact, avoid court-
martial? Yes he can, by (...) obeying the orders issued by the Captain
and the Colonel (...). O’Reilly fails to obey the Major’s order, but he has
an excuse: obeying the Major’s order would involve disobeying an order
issued by the Colonel.”
Horty’s principle seems quite acceptable: for each order issued to the agent, the
agent may ask herself if obeying the order would involve disobeying an order of a
higher ranking officer (then he is excused), and otherwise follow it. The result is a
set of imperatives where each imperative is either obeyed, or disobeyed but the
disobedience excused. When I nevertheless think the argument is not correct,
it is because I think it confuses the status quo and the status quo posterior.
Obeying the Major’s order does not, in the initial situation, involve disobeying
the Colonel’s order. Only once O’Reilly follows the Captain’s order and turns
on the heat, it is true that he must obey the Colonel, open the window and
thus violate the Major’s order. But this does not mean that he should follow the
Captain’s order in the first place – as by doing so he brings about a situation
in which he is forced, by a higher ranking order, to violate a command from
another higher ranking officer. Quite to the contrary, I think that being forced
to violate a higher ranking order when obeying a lower ranking one is a case
where following the lower one ‘involves’ such a violation, and so the only order
the agent is excused from obeying is the lowest ranking command.
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Another notion seems of importance in such examples: that of coherence,
or coherent interpretation, of the imperatives that are accepted by an agent.
Suppose I am a trainee at a factory, and over my new workplace there is a large
sign: “If the light flashes, press the red button. By order of the Director.” On
the first day, the foreman tells me “Don’t you ever press the red button.” A bit
later a colleague comes round and tells me “Let’s have some fun. Make the light
flash. Just short-circuiting it does the job”. Obviously I have not been told not
to make the light flash. By doing so, I will have to do what the sign tells me and
press the red button, and thus violate the foreman’s explicit order on my first
day. But I can reason as follows: ‘Surely, the foreman did not want to contradict
the Director’s order. But it would amount to a contradiction if the light flashes
and I do as he told me and not press the button, though the sign says otherwise.
So what the foreman meant was probably this: don’t press the button if the
light does not flash. So I can safely make the light flash as my colleague told me,
and then press the button, thus making everybody happy.’ (The consequence of
such reasoning would probably be that I lose my job, which might be what my
colleague meant by ‘fun’.) Such coherent reinterpretation plays an important role
in judicial reasoning. But our concern are sets of imperatives that may stem from
various sources and contain explicit conflicts. It is the preference ordering that
is supposed to take care of arising conflicts. And by closer examination of the
situation, if the light flashes, the apparent conflict is resolved since the foreman’s
order is overridden. Yet that does not mean that I have to accept an obligation
to bring about such a situation. If some order is to get me to make the light
flash, I think it would have to rank at least as high as the foreman’s command,
e.g. if my colleague had uttered the imperative in some state of emergency.
Consider finally this variant: suppose that if I am attacked by a man, I must
fight him (to defend my life, my family etc.). Furthermore, suppose I have pacifist
ideals which include that I must not fight the man. Now you tell me to provoke
him, which in the given situation means that he will attack me. Let self-defense
rank higher than my ideals, which in turn rank higher than your request. Should
I do as you request? By the reasoning advocated by Horty, there is nothing wrong
with it: I satisfy your request, defend myself as I must, and though I violate my
ideals, I can point out to myself that the requirement to fight back took priority.
But I think if I really do follow your advice, I would feel bad. I think this would
not just be some irrational regret for having to violate, as I must, my ideals,
but true guilt for having been tempted into doing something I should not have
done, namely provoking the man: it caused the situation that made me violate
my ideals. So I think our intuitions in the ‘drinking and driving’ example and
the other cases have been correct.
5 New Strategies and a New Proposal
In the face of the difficulties encountered so far, it seems necessary to address the
issue of finding an appropriate mechanism for a resolution of conflicts between
prioritized conditional imperatives in a more systematic manner.
Prioritized Conditional Imperatives 19
5.1 Deontically Tailored Preferred Subsets
In the unconditional case, the reason to move from definition (td -m1) to (td -m2)
was that when there are conflicts between imperatives, the former makes true
the monadic deontic formula O⊥, i.e. the agent ought to do the logically impos-
sible. This result was avoided by considering only maximal sets of imperatives
with demands that are collectively consistent, i.e. sets that do not make O⊥
true. When faced with the question what dyadic deontic formula should not be
true when conflicts are resolved for arbitrary situations C, the formula O(¬C/C)
appears to be the dyadic equivalent: it would be weird if a mechanism for con-
flict resolution results in telling the agent to do something that contradicts the
assumed facts.17 So to define the setPI({C}, I) for a truth definition (td -pcd1-
8), we can modify Brewka’s original method in such a way that it tests, at each
step, for each of the constructed subsets, if the corresponding truth-definition
(td -cd1-8) does not make O(¬C/C) true for this set.18 Formally:
Definition 6 (Deontically Tailored Preferred Subsets).
Let I = 〈I, f, g,<〉 be a prioritized conditional imperative structure, and C ∈
LPL describe the given situation. Let (td-pcd∗) be any of the truth definitions
(td-pcd1-8). Then Γ is in the set P∗I({C}, I) employed by this truth definition
iff (i) {C} 0PL ⊥, and (ii) Γ is obtained from a full prioritization ≺ by defining
Γ[≺↓i]=
{⋃
j≺ i Γ[≺↓j] ∪ {i} if 〈
⋃
j≺ i Γ[≺↓j] ∪ {i}, f, g〉 2 O(¬C/C) by (td-cd∗),⋃
j≺ i Γ[≺↓j] otherwise,
for any i ∈ I, and letting Γ = ⋃i∈I Γ[≺↓i].
By this construction, each of the preferred subsets contains a maximal number
of the imperatives such that they do not make true O(¬C/C) for the situation C
and the truth definition that is employed, and so the resulting truth definition
likewise avoids this truth. Such a construction of the preferred subsets might
be considered ‘tailored’ to the truth definition in question, and any remaining
deficiencies might be seen as stemming from the employed truth definition. But
this being so, the method reveals a strong bias towards truth definitions that
accept ‘deontic detachment’, and in particular truth definitions (td -pcd4-8):
Consider the set of imperatives I = {!p1, p1⇒!p2, !¬p2} with the ranking
!p1 < p1⇒!p2 < !¬p2, that was used to refute the ‘na¨ıve approach’. As can be
easily checked, P∗I({>}, I) = {I} for all truth definitions (td -pcd1-3). So by all
these truth definitions, O(p1 ∧ ¬p2/>) is true. So they commit us to violating
the second-ranking imperative, whereas intuitively, the third-ranking imperative
should be violated instead. By contrast, all truth definitions (td -pcd5-8), that
employ reusable output, and of course likewise (td -pcd4) that is equivalent to
(td -pcd8), handle all given examples exactly as they should be. For the set I =
17 For arguments why O(¬C/C) should be chosen, i.e. for their setting, the ‘output’
should be consistent with the ‘input’, rather than the formula O(⊥/C) and thus
consistency of output simpliciter, cf. Makinson & van der Torre [26] p. 158/159.
18 The preferred subsets are thus a choice from the ‘maxfamilies’ defined in [26].
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{!p1, p1⇒!p2, !¬p2} they produce for both, the ranking !p1 < p1⇒!p2 < !¬p2 that
was used to refute the ‘na¨ıve approach’, and the ranking p1⇒!p2 < !p1 < !¬p2
that was used to refute the stepwise approach, the set P∗I({>}, I) = {{!p1, p1⇒
!p2}}, ∗ = 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. Thus they all make true O(p1 ∧ p2/>), committing us to
violate the lowest-ranking imperative only, as it should be for these examples.
If the imperatives’ ranking is instead p1⇒!p2 < !¬p2 < !p1, that was used to
refute both the ‘reconsidering’ and the ‘fixpoint’ approaches, then P∗I({>}, I)
is {{p1⇒!p2, !¬p2}}, making O(¬p2/>) true by all these truth definitions, which
thus commit us to satisfying the second ranking imperative, and not to violating
it in favor of satisfying the third ranking imperative as these approaches did.
Finally the set I = {p1⇒!p2, !(p1 ∧ ¬p2), !p3} with the ranking p1⇒!p2 < !(p1 ∧
¬p2) < !p3, that was also mishandled by the ‘fixpoint approach’, produces the
set P∗I({>}, I) = {{p1⇒!p2, !p3}}. So it rejects the second ranking imperative,
that commits to violating the higher ranking one, and keeps both others, as it
should be. The ‘drinking and driving’ example is also handled correctly: the set
{p1⇒!¬p2, p3⇒!p2, p3⇒!p1}, with the ranking p1⇒!¬p2 < p3⇒!p2 < p3⇒!p1
produces, for the situation p3, the set PI({p3}, I) = {{p1⇒!¬p2, p3⇒!p2}}. So
the third ranking imperative, that commits the agent to drinking and thus, by
observation of the highest ranking imperative, prevents the agent from driving,
is disregarded. Instead, the truth definitions make true O(p2/p3), so the agent
must do the driving if she goes to the party, as her best friend asked her to.
Is this the solution to our problems, then? Some uneasiness remains as to the
quick way with which definitions (td-pcd1-3) were discharged as insufficient. Why
should it not be possible to maintain, as these definitions do, that conditional
imperatives only produce an obligation if they are factually triggered, while at
the same time maintaining that the above examples should not be resolved the
way they are by (td-pcd1-3)? The purpose of a truth definition for the deontic
O-operator is to find a formal notion of ‘ought’ that reflects ordinary reasoning,
and our intuitions on that matter may differ from our ideas as to what may
constitute a good choice from a possibly conflicting set of prioritized conditional
imperatives. I will now make a new proposal how to construct the ‘preferable
subsets’, that keeps the positive results without committing us to prefer any of
(td-pcd1-8) by virtue of their handling of prioritized imperatives alone.
5.2 Preferred Maximally Obeyable Subsets
What made Brewka’s approach so successful is that it maximizes the number of
higher ranking imperatives in the preferred subsets of a given set of unconditional
imperatives: for each ‘rank’, a maximal number of imperatives are added that can
be without making the set’s demands inconsistent in the given situation. As was
shown, Brewka’s approach cannot be directly applied to conditional imperatives,
since it makes no sense to test the demands of imperatives for inconsistencies
if these imperatives may not be triggered in the same circumstances. Just con-
sidering triggered imperatives is also not enough, as was demonstrated for the
‘na¨ıve approach’. But if the maximization method is to include imperatives that
are not (yet) triggered, then we must look for something else than inconsistency
of demands to take the role of a threshold criterion for the maximization process.
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To do so we should ask ourselves why, for the unconditional case, the aim
was to find a maximal set of imperatives with demands that are collectively
consistent with the situation. I think that by doing so we intend to give the
agent directives that can be safely followed. While in the unconditional case
this means that the agent can satisfy all the chosen imperatives, the situation
is different for conditional imperatives: here an agent can also obey imperatives
without necessarily satisfying them. If you tell me to visit you in case I go to
Luxembourg next month, I can safely arrange to spend all of next month at
home and still do nothing wrong. If we think not so much of imperatives, but of
legal regulations, then I can obviously be a law-abiding citizen by simply failing
to trigger any legal norm (even though this might imply living alone on an
island): whether I do that or boldly trigger some of the regulations’ antecedents
and then satisfy those I have triggered seems not a question of logic, but of
individual choice. So I think the threshold criterion to be used should be that of
obeyability: we should maximize the set of imperatives the agent can thus obey,
and only stop when the addition of an imperative means that, given the facts, it
or some already added imperative, i.e. one that ranks higher or at least as high,
can no longer be obeyed, and so will be violated.19
For a given set of conditional imperatives ∆ and a set of factual truths W ,
the subsets of imperatives that can be obeyed are described by ObeyableI(W,∆),
i.e. they are those subsets Γ ⊆ ∆ such that W ∪Γm 0PL ⊥. To maximize not by
collective consistency of demands, but by collective obeyability, Brewka’s original
approach can therefore be changed as follows:
Definition 7 (Preferred Maximally Obeyable Subsets).
Let I = 〈I, f, g,<〉 be a prioritized conditional imperative structure, ∆ be a
subset of I, and W ⊆ LPL be a set of PL-sentences. Then Γ ∈PoI(W,∆) iff (i)
W 0PL ⊥, and (ii) Γ is obtained from a full prioritization ≺ by defining
Γ[≺↓i] =
{⋃
j≺ i Γ[≺↓j] ∪ {i} if W ∪ [
⋃
j≺ i Γ[≺↓j] ∪ {i}]m 0PL ⊥, and⋃
j≺ i Γ[≺↓j] otherwise,
for any i ∈ ∆, and letting Γ = ⋃i∈∆ Γ[≺↓i].
The change from Brewka’s original definition is only minute: we test not the de-
mands of the imperatives for consistency, but their materializations. Note that
this is a conservative extension of Brewka’s method, since for any unconditional
imperative i we have `PL f(i)↔ m(i). As can easily be seen, the new construc-
tion solves all of the previously considered difficulties, regardless of the chosen
truth definition for the deontic O-operator:
• To refute a direct application of Brewka’s original method, we used the set
I = {p1⇒!p2,¬p1⇒!¬p2} with no ranking imposed. m(I) is consistent and
so PoI({p1}, I) = {I}, making O(p2/p1) true for all definitions (td-pcd1-8).
So you ought to wear your boots in case you go out, as it should be.
19 While S. O. Hansson, in [17] p. 200, also advocates a move from ‘consistency’ to
‘obeyability’, what is meant there is rather the step from (td-m2) to (td-d1).
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• To refute the ‘na¨ıve approach’, we used the set I = {!p1, p1⇒!p2, !¬p2}
with the ranking !p1 < p1⇒!p2 < !¬p2. Since I is already fully priori-
tized, the construction produces just one maximally obeyable subset, which
is {!p1, p1⇒!p2}, as its two imperatives get added in the first two steps, and
nothing is added in the third since m(I) is inconsistent. All of (td-pcd1-8)
make true O(p1/>), none makes true the non-intuitive formula O(¬p2/>),
and the definitions (td-pcd5-8) that accept ‘deontic detachment’ make true
O(p1 ∧p2/>). So you must go out and wear a scarf, which is as it should be.
• To refute the stepwise approach we used I = {!p1, p1⇒!p2, !¬p2} with the
ordering p1⇒!p2 < !p1 < !¬p2. Still PoI(>}, I) = {{!p1, p1⇒!p2}}, so the
sentences made true by truth definitions (td-pcd1-8) likewise do not change,
and in particular the non-intuitive formula O(¬p2/>) is still false, and defi-
nitions (td-pcd5-8) that accept ‘deontic detachment’ make true O(p1∧p2/>),
so again you must go out and wear a scarf, which is as it should be.
• To refute the reconsidering and the fixpoint approaches we used again the set
{!p1, p1⇒!p2, !¬p2}, but the ranking was changed into p1⇒!p2 < !¬p2 < !p1.
Now PoI(>}, I) = {{p1⇒!p2, !¬p2}}. Truth definitions (td-pcd1-8) make
true O(¬p2/>) but not O(p1/>) so you must satisfy the second ranking
imperative, but not the third ranking imperative, which is as it should be.
• Troublesome for the fixpoint approach was the set {p1⇒!p2, !(p1∧¬p2), !p3},
with the ranking p1⇒!p2 < !(p1 ∧ ¬p2) < !p3: no fixpoint could be made
out in the set and so the approach produced no preferred subset, making
everything obligatory. The preferred maximally obeyable subset is {p1⇒
!p2, !p3}, eliminating the second ranking imperative that demands a violation
of the first, and making O(p3/>) true under all truth definitions (td-pcd1-8),
which again is as it should be.
• Finally, consider the ‘drinking and driving’ example: the set of imperatives
{p1⇒!¬p2, p3⇒!p2, p3⇒!p1} produces, for the situation p3, the set of pre-
ferred maximally obeyable subsets PoI({p3}, I) = {{p1⇒!¬p2, p3⇒!p2}},
making true O(p2/p3) for all truth definitions (td-pcd1-8), so given that I go
to the party I must do the driving, which is as it should be.
As could be seen, all truth definitions now produce the ‘right’ results in the
examples used. Moreover, since all truth definitions refer to the same preferred
subsets PoI({C}, I), it is possible to index the O-operators according to the
truth definition employed, and e.g. state truths like O1(A/C) ∧ O5(B/C) →
O7(A ∧ B/C), meaning that if, for any maximal set of imperatives that I can
obey in the situation C, imperatives are triggered that demand A, and that if I
satisfy all such triggered imperatives, I will have to do B, then obeying a maximal
number of imperatives includes having to do A∧B. It may well be that natural
language ‘ought-statements’ are ambiguous in the face of conditional demands,
the discussion in sec. 3 suggested this. If maximal obeyability is accepted as the
threshold criterion that limits what norms an agent can be expected to conform
to in a given situation, then definition 7 leaves the philosophical logician with
maximal freedom as to what deontic operator is chosen.
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6 Further Research
6.1 Benchmark examples for non-prioritized imperatives
Inevitably there remains further work to do. First of all, it seems worthwhile to
consider what happens if the imperatives are not prioritized, in the sense that
either there is no ranking between them or that they all have the same priority.
It is immediate that for such imperatives, the set of preferred subsetsPoI(W,∆)
for a prioritized conditional imperative structure I = 〈I, f, g,<〉 and a subset
of the imperatives ∆, equals max⊆ObeyableI(W,∆), i.e. the preferred subsets
are just all the maximally obeyable subsets of ∆, given the facts W . There exist
a number of benchmark examples for non-prioritized conditional imperatives,
given by Makinson in [24], and I list without proof the solutions we obtain for
these examples for the O-operators defined here.
Source and name Imperatives Non-truths Truths
von Wright [?]
window closing
r ⇒!c, s⇒!¬c O(c ∧ ¬c/r ∧ s) O(c ∨ ¬c/r ∧ s)
Chisholm [7]
help and inform
!h, h⇒!i, ¬h⇒!¬i O(h/¬h),
O(i/¬h)
O(h ∧ i/>),
O(¬i/¬h)
Forrester [9]
gentle murderer
!¬k, k ⇒!g O(g/>),
O(¬k/k)
O(¬k/>),
O(g/k)
Belzer [3]
Reykjavik scenario
1. !(¬r∧¬g), r ⇒!g, g ⇒!r
2. !¬r, !¬g, r ⇒!g, g ⇒!r
O(¬g/r) O(g/r)
Prakken& Sergot [33]
cigarettes from a killer
!¬k, !¬c, k ⇒!c O(¬k/k) O(c/k) fails!
Prakken& Sergot [33]
white fence and dog
!¬f ,f ⇒!(f ∧ w),
d⇒!(f ∧ w)
O(¬f/f),
O(¬f/f ∧ d)
O(f ∧ w/f),
O(f ∧ w/d ∧ f)
O(f∧w/d) fails!
van der Torre [42]
apples and pears
1. !(a ∨ p), !¬a
2. !(a ∨ p)
3. ¬p⇒!a, ¬a⇒!p
O(¬a/a) O(¬a ∧ p/>),
O(¬a ∧ p/¬a)
O(p/¬a)I
O(p/¬a)
van der Torre [42]
joining paths
!a, !b O(a∧ b/¬a∨¬b) O(a∨b/¬a∨¬b)
Makinson [24]
Mo¨bius strip
a⇒!b, b⇒!c, c⇒!¬a O(¬a/a) O(c/a) fails!
Makinson [24]
exclusive options
c⇒!(a ∧ b), ¬c⇒!(a ∧ ¬b) O(a/>)II
I O-operators that accept ‘circumstantial reasoning’ only, i.e.(td-pcd2,4,6,8).
II O-operators that accept ‘reasoning by cases’ only, i.e. (td-pcd3,4,7,8).
So there are three benchmark examples for which our definitions fail:
In the first one, proposed by Prakken & Sergot [33] and termed ‘cigarettes
from a killer’, the imperative !¬k is intended to mean that you should not kill
a certain man, !¬c means that you should not offer this man a cigarette, and
k ⇒!c means that if you kill the man, you should offer him a cigarette first.
Prakken & Sergot argue that the solution should make true O(c/k), as this
applies the imperative that is more specific for the given circumstances, but
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none of the operators provides this result. A similar idea underlies the second
example, also proposed by Prakken & Sergot [33] and termed above ‘white fence
and dog’. There is a general prohibition of fences !¬f except if there already is
one – in that case it should be white, i.e. f ⇒!(f ∧ w) – or if the owner has
a dog, in which case the owner should have a white fence, i.e. d ⇒!(f ∧ w).
Again, Prakken & Sergot intend the more specific imperative to be applied in
the situation where there is a dog, and so argue that O(f ∧ w/d) should hold.
It is true none of the operators defined above includes a ‘specificity test’, and
I do not think that this is a defect. The legal principle lex specialis derogat legi
generali is not universally applicable to all sets of norms, in particular if they
may stem from various sources, and even in the realm of law it competes with
other principles like lex posterior, lex superiori, or standard argument forms like
teleological interpretation. But if in the given case the more specific imperative
should take priority, we can use a priority ordering that includes k ⇒!c < !¬c
in case of the first example, and d ⇒!(f ∧ w) < !¬f in the case of the second.
Then all operators (td -pcd1-8) make true O(c/k) and O(f ∧ w/d), as intended.
The third example that the truth definitions fail is Makinson’s [24] ‘Mo¨bius
strip’: here the set of imperatives is {a ⇒!b, b ⇒!c, c ⇒!¬a}. Makinson argues
that intuitively, O(b ∧ c/a) should hold. But as is immediate, any maximally
obeyable set includes just two of the given imperatives, which does not suffice
for the truth of O(b∧ c/a) for any of (td -pcd1-8). The argument why O(b∧ c/a)
ought to be true seems to be that since the consequent of the third imperative
c⇒!¬a is false in the supposed situation a, the agent cannot do anything about
it even if its antecedent becomes true, and so this imperative should not be
considered.20 But is this argument sound? Even if the consequent is inevitably
false, there will be a violation only if its antecedent is (made) true. Certainly,
I do not think that the agent should, in such cases, be under an obligation
to make the antecedent false – this would introduce a ‘deontic contraposition’
that, as we saw, is not generally desirable. But that does not mean that the
agent should accept an obligation to make the antecedent true. Consider this
example: a professor tells a student that next time he sees her, he must have
some written paper to present. The student’s mother, who is worried about his
PhD not getting finished, wants him to see his professor. The fact is: he does not,
and will not, have a written paper. Should he therefore have to go and see his
professor? I think that it is entirely up to the agent which of the two imperatives
he is going to obey, either attributing higher weight to the explicit order of his
professor, or giving priority to alleviating his mother’s worries. Similarly, in the
case of the Mo¨bius strip, it may be that the agent has reasons to think that
she must rather disobey one of the first two imperatives than violate the third.
Then the set {a ⇒!b, b ⇒!c} is not an acceptable choice in the situation a, so
O(b∧c/a) should not be true, and so not providing this truth seems not a defect.
20 Similarly, Greenspan [12] argues that “it seems that oughts are no longer in force
when it is too late to see to it that their objects are fulfilled”.
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6.2 Theorems
Truth definitions (td-pcd1-8) define when a sentence of the form O(A/C) is true
or false with respect to a prioritized conditional structure I and a situation C. So
I briefly consider what sentences are theorems, i. e. hold for all such structures,
given the usual truth definitions for Boolean operators. It is immediate that
for all truth definitions, (DExt), (DM), (DC), (DN) and (DD-R) are theorems.
(DD-R) states that there cannot be both an obligation to bring about A and one
to bring about ¬A unless the situation C is logically impossible, so our truth
definitions succeed in eliminating conflicts. All these theorems are ‘monadic’ in
the sense that the situation C is kept fixed; in fact, they are the C-relative equiv-
alents of standard deontic logic SDL. More interesting are theorems describing
the relations between obligations in different circumstances. Obviously we have
(ExtC) If `PL C ↔ D then O(A/C)↔ O(A/D) is a theorem
for all truth definitions, i.e. for equivalent situations C, the obligations do not
change. As long as truth definitions are not sensitive to conflicts, e.g. for (td -
cd1-8), we have ‘strengthening of the antecedent’, i.e. for these definitions
(SA) O(A/C)→ O(A/C ∧D)
holds. When only maximally obeyable subsets are considered, i.e. for truth def-
initions (td -pcd1-8), both (SA) and the weaker ‘rational monotonicity’ theorem
(RM) ¬O(¬D/C) ∧O(A/C)→ O(A/C ∧D)
are refuted e.g. by a set I = {!(p1 ∧ p2), !(p1 ∧¬p2), p2⇒¬p1} of equally ranking
imperatives: though O(p1/>) is true and O(¬p2/>) false, O(p1/p2) is false.
However, for all definitions(td -pcd1-8), ‘(conjunctive) cautious monotonicity’
(CCMon) O(A ∧D/C)→ O(A/C ∧D)
holds, which states that if you should to two things and you do one of them,
you still have the other one left.21 Moreover, truth definitions (td -pcd2,4,6,8)
validate the ‘circumstantial extensionality’ rule
(CExt) If `PL C → (A↔ B) then O(A/C)↔ O(B/C) is a theorem
that corresponds to ‘circumstantial reasoning’. All definitions that accept ‘rea-
soning by cases’, i.e. (td -pcd3,4,7,8), make
(Or) O(A/C) ∧O(A/D)→ O(A/C ∨D)
a theorem. Note that (CExt) and (Or) derive
(Cond) O(A/C ∧D)→ O(D → A/C),
which in turn derives (Or) in the presence of (DC), and that by adding (CExt)
and (Or) we obtain again the system PD (cf. sec. 3). Finally, all definitions with
‘deontic detachment’, i.e. (td -pcd5,6,7,8), make
(Cut) O(A/C ∧D) ∧O(D/C)→ O(A/C)
a theorem. (Cut) is derivable given (Cond) (use Cond on the first conjunct
O(A/C ∧ D) to obtain O(D → A/C), agglomerate with O(D/C), and from
O(D ∧ (D → A)/C) derive O(A/C)), which syntactically mirrors the semantic
21 This is B. Hansson’s [16] theorem (19).
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equivalence of definitions (td -pcd4) and (td -pcd8). Theoremhood of all of the
above theorems for semantics that employ the respective truth definitions is
easily proved and left to the reader (cf. my [14] and [15] as well as Makinson &
van der Torre [25] for the general outline). Makinson & van der Torre’s results
also suggest that these theorems axiomatically define complete systems of deontic
logic with respect to semantics that employ the respective truth definitions (td -
pcd1-8), but this remains a conjecture that further study must corroborate.22
6.3 Questions of representation
One might wonder if it is always adequate to represent a natural language con-
ditional imperative ‘if ... then bring about that ww’ by use of a set I containing
an imperative i with a g(i) that formalizes ‘...’ and a f(i) that formalizes ‘ww’.
This is because there is a second possibility: represent the natural language con-
ditional imperative by an unconditional imperative p!(g(i)→ f(i))q. We saw in
sec. 3 that this is not generally adequate. But that does not mean that such a
representation is not sometimes what is required. Consider the crucial imper-
atives in the previous examples: perhaps what your mother meant was simply
‘don’t drink and drive’; perhaps what the doctor meant was ‘don’t go out with-
out a scarf’; perhaps the Colonel meant to tell O’Reilly not to do both, turn
the heat on and keep the window closed; perhaps the sign wanted me to see to
it that the light does not flash without the button being pressed, perhaps self-
defense required me to see to it that I am not attacked without fighting back.
These interpretations seem not wholly unreasonable, and if they are adequate,
then the best representation would be by an imperative p!(g(i)→ f(i))q instead
of pg(i) ⇒!f(i)q. It is easy to see that with such a representation, all of the
discussed methods would have resolved these examples.
What then are the conditions that make a representation by an unconditional
imperative adequate? One test may be to ask: ‘Would bringing about the absence
of the antecedent condition count as satisfaction of the imperative?’. Would not
drinking, not going out, not turning on the heat, making the light not flash,
making the man not attack, count as properly reacting to the imperatives in
question? It should be if what the imperatives demand is a material conditional,
since then the conditional imperatives in question are equivalent to telling the
agent ‘either don’t drink or don’t drive, its your decision’, ‘either don’t go out, or
wear a scarf’, ‘either don’t turn on the heat, or open the window’, etc. Another
test would be to examine if contraposition is acceptable. Can we say that your
mother wanted you not to drink if you are going to drive, that the doctor wanted
you to stay inside if you are not going to wear a scarf, that the Colonel wanted
O’Reilly to turn off the heat if the window is closed, that the sign wants you to
make the light not flash if the button is not pressed, that self-defense requires
you to make the man not attack if you are not going to fight back? If the proper
representation is by imperatives that demand a material conditional, then the
answers should be affirmative. I do not think these are easy questions, however,
and leave them to the reader to discuss and answer at his or her own discretion.
22 For (td-pcd4,8), completeness of PD is immediate from the results in [14], [15].
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6.4 The problem of permission
The definition of the deontic notion of permission in a context of conditional
norms is troublesome.23 For monadic deontic logic it is generally accepted to
define (weak) permission through the absence of an obligation to the contrary, i.e.
PA =df ¬O¬A. This has the additional effect of making OA∨P¬A a tautology,
and so there are not ‘gaps’ – any state of affairs is positively or negatively
regulated. For dyadic operators, the analogue would be P (A/C) =df ¬O(¬A/C).
But this leads here to counterintuitive results: consider the set I = {p1⇒!p2},
with the intended interpretation ‘if you go out, wear your boots’, and truth
definitions (td -pcd1,2,3,5,6,7), i.e. those truth definitions that do not collapse
into reasoning about the imperatives’ materializations. For all these we have I 2
O(p1 → p2/>), and so by the above definition we have I |= P (p1 ∧ ¬p2/>). So
you are permitted to go out without your boots. There are several proposals that
overcome this difficulty. Von Wright, in his re-interpretation of deontic logic as
rules for rational norm-giving from [46] onwards, has denied the interdefinability
of obligation and permission altogether; his theory has the result that in the
absence of explicit permissive norms we only have that OA implies PA, i.e.
anything permitted is also obligatory. Quite similarly, Makinson & van der Torre
[27] have proposed two definitions of conditional permission that, in the absence
of explicit permissive norms, either make it coincide with obligation (‘forward
permission’), or come quite close to it, by demanding that by forbidding the
behavior for the same condition, a conflict would be created for some situation
(‘backward permission’). All these approaches have the strange result that the
less is obligatory, the less is allowed.24 But surely one can, in some weak sense,
say that given the presence of some (conditional) imperatives, an agent is still
free to do A in a situation C, without saying that A is also obligatory in this
situation. It is perhaps a better solution to define
I |= P (A/C) iff ∃Γ ∈PI({C}, I) : Γm ∪ {C} 0PL ¬A,
thus defining A as permissible in a situation C if there is a preferred maximally
obeyable subset of the imperatives for which bringing about A does not cause
a violation. For operators other than (td -pcd4,8), this definition is not ‘gapless’.
E.g. consider the set I = {!p1, p1⇒!p2}. For truth definitions that do not accept
‘deontic detachment’, i.e. (td -pcd1,2,3), we have neither O(p2/>) nor P (¬p2/>):
though we are not yet under an obligation to bring about p2, we are also not
permitted to bring about ¬p2 and thus make satisfaction of the imperative im-
possible that ought to be triggered. Or consider conditional imperatives whose
23 I do not consider here the problem of how permissive norms, or licenses, may be
represented. For attempts to use a separate set of ‘P-norms’ alongside what is here
the set of imperatives cf. Alchourro´n & Bulygin [1], von Wright [46], Makinson [24]
and Makinson & van der Torre [27].
24 Consider the set I = {p1⇒!pi | i > 1}, and for an interpretation suppose that I
have no obligations in the rest of the world, but am a slave once I go to Australia.
By ‘forward’ or ‘backward’ permission, P (A/¬p1) is false for any A, i.e. I am not
allowed to do anything if I do not go to Australia, and though P (pi/>) holds for
backward permission, it is only by virtue of pi being obligatory down under.
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consequent has become impossible to satisfy: for a set I = {p1⇒!p2} we do not
have O(¬p1/¬p2) for truth definitions other than (td -pcd4,8) since p1⇒!p2 is
not triggered in the situation ¬p2, but it is also not permitted to trigger it, i.e.
P (p1/¬p2) is not true. This deontic vagueness may indeed be adequate for such
situations. Further study must determine if such a definition does not create
counterintuitive results. But it is important to see that as far as reasoning about
conditional norms is concerned, the old definitions of permission as the absence
of prohibition, obligation as the absence of a permission to the contrary, and
prohibition as the absence of permission, do no longer hold.
7 Conclusion
Reasoning about obligations when faced with different and possibly conditional
imperatives is a part of everyday life. To avoid conflicts, these imperatives may
be ordered by priority and then observed according to their respective ranks. The
‘drinking and driving’ case in the introduction presented an example of such nat-
ural reasoning. To provide a formal account is, however, additionally complicated
by the fact that there are various and mutually exclusive intuitions about what
belongs to the right definition of an ‘obligation in the face of conditional imper-
atives’, i.e. the definition of a deontic O-operator. Based on similar definitions of
operators by Makinson & van der Torre [25], [26] for their ‘input/output logic’,
but leaving the choice of the ‘right’ operator to the reader, I presented several
proposals in sec. 3 for definitions of a dyadic O-operator, namely (td -pcd1-8).
These were dependent on a choice of ‘preferred subsets’ among a given set of
prioritized conditional imperatives. A particularly successful method to identify
such subsets, but applying to unconditional imperatives only, was Brewka’s [4]
definition of ‘preferred subtheories’ within a theory. In sec. 4 I discussed various
approaches that extend this method to conditional imperatives, but these failed
to produce satisfactory results for a number of given examples. In sec. 5 I first
examined an approach that ‘tailors’ the choice procedure to the truth definition
for the deontic O-operator in question, where the only criterion is to avoid the
truth of O(¬C/C) for possible circumstances C. Though this finally produced
the intended results, it did so for truth definitions (td -pcd4-8) only, whereas
counterexamples remained for any of the weaker truth definitions (td -pcd1-3). I
then argued that the solution is to adapt Brewka’s method in such a way that it
constructs, instead of maximal subsets of imperatives that are collectively sat-
isfiable by an agent, maximally obeyable subsets of the imperatives. I showed
that this new proposal provides adequate solutions to all of the examples, and in
particular the ‘drinking and driving’ example is resolved in a satisfactory fashion
for all of the discussed deontic operators. In sec. 6 I demonstrated that the new
proposal also includes satisfactory results for benchmark examples developed for
non-prioritized conditional imperatives; I presented theorems of a deontic logic
based on this proposal (though the question of their completeness had to be left
open), and finally I showed that there are problems for the representation of
conditional imperatives and difficulties for the definition of a deontic P -operator
that further philosophical discussion and research must address.
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